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THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S NEW
SPORT PILOT LICENSE AND THE TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S NEW FLIGHT
SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES:
DO THEY RENDER THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY
MORE VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS?
JEFF GULBAS
INTRODUCTION
k FJER CLEANING UP the rubble from the terrorist attacks
1f September 11, 2001, lawmakers undertook the daunting
task of determining how the world's most devastating terrorist
attacks were carried out on American soil, and how the world's
most efficient intelligence agencies failed to prevent them.
Among the intelligence memos and reports was evidence that
the terrorists who piloted the four planes were trained in United
States flight schools.' Despite a flood of warnings of possible
terrorist attacks involving commercial airliners in the months
prior to September 11, the United States Department of Trans-
portation's Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") failed to is-
sue any real warnings because there was "no credible evidence
of specific plans to attack U.S. civil aviation. "2 Although mea-
sures to scrutinize students at U.S. flight training schools have
since been implemented,': the threat of aircraft hijackings is still
very real. Now there is a new addition to the FAA's worries - the
I NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORr 224-27 (2004) (hereinafter "9/11 COMMISSION REPORT").
2 Id. at 259 (citing FAA, Information Circular, Continued Middle Eastern Threats
to Civil Aviation, IC-2001-04A (2001).
3 See Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA Takes Over
Security Threat Assessments On Non-U.S. Citizens Seeking Flight School Train-
ing, (Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/pressre-
lease/press release_0529.xml (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
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new sport pilot license, which relaxes the requirements for indi-
viduals to obtain basic flight training.4
On September 1, 2004, the FAA's new "sport pilot laws" took
effect. The sport pilot licen'se ("SPL") is a new category of pilot
certification created by the FAA to make it easier for recreation
aircraft enthusiasts to become licensed to fly.5 The new rule al-
lows aviation enthusiasts to earn their SPL with less training, due
to the relaxed requirements, as compared to other aircraft li-
censes. 6 The FAA states that its two important objectives in cre-
ating the new flight standards are the "safety of recreational
flying" and "introducing new enthusiasts to the sport. '7 Though
the new license will increase flight school enrollment, as well as
the number of licensed pilots, the FAA has not described terror-
ism as a concern with the new license. In fact, the SPL has been
hailed as a major milestone in making recreational flying more
affordable and readily available.' There may be latent
problems, however, in the new requirements for sport pilot cer-
tification. Only time will tell whether terrorists will take advan-
tage of the relaxed requirements and use the SPL to carry out
attacks involving aircraft.
One of the more troubling discoveries about the 9/11 attacks
was that the attackers who piloted the commercial airliners
learned to fly in U.S. flight training schools in Florida, Arizona,
and Minnesota. 9 Some flights schools even alerted the FAA
about suspicious students - who later turned out to be responsi-
ble for the attacks.1" Some of these students (including Hani
Hanjour, who piloted the airliner that crashed into the Penta-
gon) raised eyebrows because they struggled with English - "the
4 Leslie Miller, Sport Pilot's License will make it easier to fly slow and low, THE
BArrALION ONLINE, July 20, 2004, available at http://www.thebatt.com/news/
2004/07/20/News/Sport.Pilots.License.Will.Make.It.Easier.To.Fly.Low.And.
Slow-694470.html; see also About the Sport Pilot Certificate, http://www.sportpi-
lot.org/becoming (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
5 Experimental Aircraft Association, Inc. ("EAA") About the Sport Pilot certificate,
http://www.sportpilot.org/becoming (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
6 Miller, supra note 4.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 152-69; Arnold Beichman, Who
Trained the Terrorists?, HOOVER DIGEST, Sept. 18, 2001, http://www.hooverdigest.
org/014/beichman.html.
10 Greg Gordon, Right School Warned FBI in August, STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 21,




universal language of aviation."'' Further, some of the 9/11 at-
tackers were allowed to continue their training despite expres-
sing only an interest in learning to takeoff and land a 747
commercial airliner.' 2 These revelations prompted Washington
to scrutinize U.S. flight training schools as well as students who
apply to train at flight schools.
The discovery that the 9/11 hijackers were trained in U.S.
flight schools induced Congress to enact the Aviation and Trans-
portation Security Act,'" which mandated that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice investigate students enrolled at U.S. flight
schools and assess any security threats posed by non-U.S. citi-
zens.' 4 The Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") as-
sumed responsibility for these checks in October 2004.' 5
Although the policies behind these threat assessments are obvi-
ous and important, the security protocols have been received
with significant discord from civil aviation enthusiasts.
Flight schools criticize the rule for its negative effects on the
civil aviation industry.' 6 In addition to increasing costs for flight
school applicants, the security protocols have already proven
that they discourage foreign students from seeking training alto-
gether. Non-U.S. citizens who seek training for the SPL will now
be subject to the threat assessments. Flight instructors argue
that this will increase the number of screenings performed by
the TSA and increase the hurdles for sport pilot enthusiasts.
The screenings will undoubtedly increase red tape for the TSA,
the agency responsible for investigating non-U.S. citizen flight
students. 7
This commentary analyzes the implications of the new SPL
and the new flight school security threat assessments and asks
whether they make general aviation more vulnerable to terrorist
attacks. Although general recreational aviation is crucial to the
entire aviation industry, it is recently becoming more attractive
to terrorists because the vulnerabilities of commercial aviation
I1 Id.
12 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 273.
13 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001).
14 TSA Press Release, supra note 3.
15 Id.
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have been drastically reduced post-9/11. I' Part I will address
the new requirements needed to earn an SPL, including eligible
persons and aircraft, and compare these to other private airman
licenses. The limits of the SPL are also discussed in Part I. Part
II analyzes the potential destructive capabilities, if any, that
might be caused by terrorist attacks involving the lighter aircraft
applicable to the SPL. Part III discusses whether an individual,
who has no additional flight training, other than an SPL, can
pilot larger, heavier, complex aircraft with more destructive ca-
pabilities. Part IV briefly discusses any security assessments that
existed prior to 9/11, and how they applied to U.S. flight school
applicants. Part V discusses the TSA's recent protocols that as-
sess security threats of flight students and how those protocols
will impact individuals seeking their SPL. Part VI addresses the
related topic of whether the new TSA security protocols will neg-
atively impact the general aviation industry by placing stringent
security measures on flight students and instructors. The con-
clusion shows that the SPL is a crucial new asset to recreational
aviation, and despite concerns that terrorists will use it to carry
out another 9 /ll-style attack, the SPL is not likely to prompt an
influx of terrorists to enter U.S. flight schools. However, be-
cause the new threat assessments are far from perfect and sub-
ject to heavy criticism, the conclusion recommends changes that
will promote the SPL and recreational aviation, but will main-
tain the safety of general recreational aviation.
PART I - THE REQUIREMENTS TO TRAIN FOR THE SPL AND THE
SPL's LIMITATIONS. 19
The SPL is the lowest-rated pilot license available; it is the eas-
iest to acquire, but it has significant limitations. 20 Pilots will
learn "the core knowledge that individuals must understand and
demonstrate in order to safely operate in the airspace system"
from SPL training.21 Among aviation enthusiasts, the SPL is her-
alded as a major milestone in promoting recreational and gen-
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TSA, Security Guidelines for General
Aviation Airports, Information Publication A-001 at 4 (2004), available at http://
www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/security-guidelines-forgeneral-aviationair
ports-may_2004_a-001.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
19 "Flight training" is defined as "instruction received from a flight school in an
aircraft or aircraft simulator." 49 C.F.R. § 1552.1(b) (2005).
20 See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 61,303, 61.307, 61.309, 61.313, 61.315 (2005).
21 EAA Website, About the Sport Pilot Certificate, supra note 4.
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eral aviation."2 "If you've always wanted to become a pilot or
own an aircraft, but the cost and the time required were too
much, today is your big day. Getting wings just got considerably
less expensive ... [a] nd light sport aviation just got an infusion
of safety."2" The biggest cause for aviation enthusiasts' praise for
the SPL was the reduction in training time that is needed before
an individual can fly without an instructor. In this regard, the
Experimental Aircraft Association ("EAA") estimates that new
pilots will be able to fly "powered aircraft" in "as little as 20
hours of instruction. '2 4 To qualify for the SPL, the applicant is
merely required to be seventeen years or older before testing for
the license, be able to read, write and understand English, hold
a valid airman's medical or valid U.S. driver's license and, of
course, pass the required FAA flight tests and written exams.2
The required FAA exams include an "aeronautical knowledge
test" which tests a laundry-list of topics, including sport pilot
privileges and the SPL's restrictions, flight operations, accident
reporting, use of FAA information and advisories, use of aero-
nautical charts for navigation, recognition of critical weather,
weight and balance computations, principles of aerodynamics,
and risk management." Further, the SPL applicant must pass a
"practical test," which requires proficiency in pre-flight proce-
dures, takeoffs and landings, in-flight performance maneuvers,
ground-reference maneuvers, navigation, slow flight and stalls,
handling emergency situations and post-flight procedures."
These subjects are taught by authorized instructors when the
22 Id.
23 Marion Bladey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, Remotes at
the Sport Pilot Rule Media Event, (July 20, 2004), available at http://ww,.faa.
gov/news/speaches/Blakev/2004/speeches-bladey_040720.htm.
24 EAA Website, About the Sport Pilot License, supra note 4; see also 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.309 (2005) (requiring only ten hours of flight time for a glider, two to four
hours for a balloon, and twenty-five hours for a powered parachute).
25 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.301, 61.303, 61.305 (2005). The FAA issued an advisory cir-
cular to guide flight instructors in their determination of whether a flight student
can understand the English language. When a question exists as to whether an
applicant understands the English language, the instructor should examine the
applicant's speech and accent, sentence patterns, and interpretation of excerpts
from technical manuals. The instructor has discretion to determine if the appli-
cant has met the English language requirements. Students who do not satisfy the
requirement are referred to a Flight Standards District Office for review by an
aviation safety inspector. FAA, Advisory Circular No. 60-28 (1997).
26 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.307, 61.309 (2005).
27 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.307, 61.311 (2005).
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trainee attends ground school and in-flight training. The re-
quired training is minimal.
The SPL requires little ground and in-flight training.28 Sport
pilot applicants must receive ground training from an author-
ized instructor and log a predetermined number of hours learn-
ing particular flight procedures. For example, a pilot who seeks
to fly a single-engine airplane must log twenty hours of flight
time with at least fifteen hours from an authorized instructor
and five hours of solo flight from takeoff to landing.29 The
twenty hours must include two hours of cross-country flight, ten
takeoffs and landings to a full stop at an airport, one solo cross-
country flight of at least seventy-five nautical miles with a full-
stop landing at two points along the flight path and three hours
of flight training within a sixty-day period before the date of the
practical test.3 There are even fewer requirements for individu-
als seeking training on a powered parachute, gyroplane, airship,
or balloon.3 1 These requirements are significantly less onerous
than the requirements to earn a private pilot license or a recrea-
tional pilot license for a single-engine airplane - which require a
minimum of forty hours of flight logged in an airplane, as well
as cross-country and night-time flight requirements. 3 2
Prior to the debut of the SPL, recreational aviation enthusi-
asts complied with the requirements for the recreational pilot
license, the previously lowest-rated license. The recreational pi-
lot license required a minimum of thirty hours of flight time
with at least fifteen hours of authorized instruction in pre-flight
preparation and procedures, airport operations, takeoff and
landing, performance maneuvers, ground reference maneuvers,
navigation, slow flight and stalls, emergency procedures and
post-flight procedures.3 The recreational pilot license required
the thirty hours to include two hours of flight to an airport more
than twenty-five nautical miles from where the pilot usually
trains, with three takeoffs and landings at such an airport and,
further, that the hours be logged in an aircraft of the rating-type
28 See generally 14 C.F.R. § 61.309 (2005).
29 14 C.F.R. § 61.313(a) (2005). The required hours are less for applicants
flying a glider (non-powered aircraft), gyroplanes, airships, balloons, and pow-
ered parachutes.
30 Id.
31 14 C.F.R. § 61.313(d)-(g) (2005).
32 14 C.F.R. § 61.109(a)(1)-(2) (2005).
3 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.98-61.99 (2005).
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sought.34 Three hours of solo flight were required, as well as
three flight hours within sixty days before the applicant took the
practical test.3 5
Due to the relative ease of obtaining an SPL, it is encumbered
with substantial flight restrictions. Some of the more significant
restrictions effectively limit sport pilots to daytime flights, when
the surface of the earth is visible (or when visibility is equal or
greater than three miles). Further, sport pilots may carry no
more than one passenger and cannot charge a fee to transport a
passenger (i.e. no passengers-for-hire). Additionally, the SPL
carries certain airspace restrictions, and sport pilots cannot fly
higher than the altitude-ceiling of 10,000 feet. 6 Further, no
sport pilot may fly outside of United States without authoriza-
tion from the destination country." Finally, sport pilots who use
their drivers' licenses to meet the application requirements
must also comply with any restrictions placed on their U.S. driv-
ers' licenses, or any limitation imposed by judicial or administra-
tive order.38
Perhaps the most restrictive limitation of the SPL is the cate-
gory of aircraft that can be flown. The SPL applies to light-sport
aircraft, which includes airplanes, gliders, gyroplanes, balloons,
airships, weight-shift control aircraft and powered parachutes."
These light-sport aircraft are generally "small, simple, light-
weight, low-performance, low-energy aircraft," and they are rela-
tively easy to fly.40 Such aircraft have a maximum takeoff
weight4 of not more than 1,320 pounds (1,430 pounds for sea-
14 14 C.F.R. § 61.99(a)(1), (b) (2005)
35 !d. § 61.99 (a) (1)-(2).
36 14 C.F.R. § 61.315(a) (c) (2), (4), (8), (11), (12) (2005). Sport pilots cannot
fly in Class A airspace; nor can they fly in Class B, C, and D airspace, nor at an
airport located in Class B, C, or D airspace, nor to, from, through, or at an air-
port having an operational control tower. Id. § 61.315(a)(6)-(7). The pilot may,
however, fly in these restricted airspaces but only after the pilot passes proficiency
tests in the use of "radios, communications, navigation system/facilities, and ra-
dar services", proficiency in the use of airport with a control tower and participa-
tion in the traffic pattern, and knowledge of airspace and traffic control
clearances. 14 C.F.R. § 61.325(a)-(b) (2005).
37 14 C.F.R § 61.99 (c)(8) (2005).
38 Id. § 61.99(c)(17).
39 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2005).
40 Fact Sheet, Federal Aviation Administration, Sport Pilot, Light-Sport Aircraft
Rule (July 20, 2005), available at http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/2004/fact
sheets_040720.htm.
41 The maximum weight of a light-sport aircraft is the sum of aircraft empty
weight, weight of the passenger for each seat installed, baggage allowance for
each passenger, and full fuel, including a minimum of the half-hour fuel reserve
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planes); a maximum airspeed of 120 knots; and a maximum
stalling speed of forty-five knots.4 2 They are limited to a maxi-
mum seating of two persons (including the pilot), and they must
have a fixed-pitch propeller, fixed landing gear, and a non-pres-
surized cabin.43 The FAA "did not include helicopters [in the
SPL] because their complex design, manufacture, and opera-
tion is beyond what the FAA envisioned for light-sport
aircraft."44
Because the FAA's primary reason for creating the SPL was to
promote recreational aviation, the SPL can be obtained quickly,
easily and at low cost. These benefits, however, are accompa-
nied by limitations that effectively make the SPL useful only for
recreational aviation.45 One such limitation gives a sport pilot
few options for the aircraft he can fly. This limitation, however,
was created by the FAA after recognizing the dangers of al-
lowing a sport pilot, who has only basic flight training, to fly
large, high-performance aircraft.46
PART II - THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE SMALLER




It should be obvious that the small, single-engine, light-sport
aircraft cannot, by itself, create the massive destruction wit-
nessed on 9/11. Simply put, they are much too small and light-
weight to penetrate steel and concrete edifices. Yet, small
aircraft can still play a deadly role in aviation terrorism. For ex-
ample, small planes can be outfitted into flying bombs that can
level tall buildings - a scenario already contemplated by ter-
rorists. Additionally, small aircraft could destroy a commercial
airliner if they collided during takeoff or landing. The possibil-
ity of these scenarios is discussed in turn.
required for day visual flight rules. Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the
Operation of Light-Sport Aircraft, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,772, 44,794 (July 27, 2004)
(codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 43, 45, 61, 65, 91).
42 Fact Sheet, supra note 40.
43 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2005)..
44 Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Air-
craft, 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,792.




The destructive capacity of commercial aircraft versus that of light-
sport aircraft.
The commercial airliners that were hijacked on 9/11 were
much larger, faster and heavier than light-sport aircraft. The
two types of aircraft used in the 9/11 attacks47 had maximum
takeoff weights of 450,000 pounds (Boeing 767) and 272,500
pounds (Boeing 757). These heavy aircraft fly at speeds up to
530 knots (982 km/h)." Comparably, the maximum weight of
light-sport aircraft under the SPL is a 1,430-pound seaplane with
a maximum speed of 120 knots.49 "In the FAA's judgment, the
weight limit in the [sport pilot] rule is appropriate for the light-
sport aircraft to be compatible with the skills and training of the
sport pilot. 115 Commercial airliners are capable of massive de-
struction because they are heavy, fast, and they carry a large
amount of fuel - attributes that all light-sport aircraft lack. 51 Be-
cause of its size, a light-sport aircraft will likely not destroy a
building in a collision.
Illustrating this point is the tale of Charles Bishop, the fifteen-
year-old pilot who cormitted suicide by flying a small, single-
engine Cessna into a skyscraper in Tampa, Florida in 2002. He
flew the tiny airplane into the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth
floors of a forty-two-floor Bank of America building; he was a
student pilot.5 2 "The student pilot took off without clearance,
[and] traversed military airspace without permission ....
The small plane did cause some damage to the building, "but no
one inside the building or on the ground was injured by the
crash itself or by falling debris. There was no fire, and the stu-
47 The two planes that crashed into the north and south towers of the World
Trade Center were Boeing 767s. The two that crashed into the Pentagon and
Shanksville, Pennsylvania were Boeing 757s. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, at 4, 7-8, 10, 14.
48 Commerical Airplanes, http://ww.boeing.com/commercial/flash.html
(last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
49 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2005).
51 Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Air-
craft, 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,794.
51 The Boeing 767 carries a maximum 23,980 gallons of fuel; the Boeing 757
carries a maximlum 11,466 gallons. Commercial Airplanes, supra note 48. One
reason the particular flights on 9/11 were hijacked was because they were long,
cross-country flights and the terrorists wanted planes that "would be full of fuel."
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 245.
52 BBC News, US Investigates 'suicide' plane crash, BBC NEWs ONLIN (Jan. 6,
2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1746192.stm.
5- FAA Notice, Federal Aviation Administration, Suggestions for Enhanced Se-
curity for Flight Schools and Fixed Base Operators (July 9, 2002).
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dent was the only fatality. '54 This situation illustrates that a
light-sport aircraft may not cause widespread casualties when
flown into a building. Nothing, however, prevents a sport pilot
from crashing his craft into an open football stadium, Central
Park, or any other outdoor gathering where victims may not be
protected by steel and concrete. Thus, a small plane is not likely
to destroy a skyscraper or even cause much damage to a smaller
building. A small plane crash in a crowd of people, however,
would likely have devastating effects.
Despite their size, small aircraft can still be deadly.
While light-sport aircraft, alone, are not a serious threat to
large buildings, bridges and monuments, history shows that they
can nevertheless be used to inflict widespread destruction. A
small aircraft is convertible into a deadly weapon. The first at-
tack on the World Trade Center in 1993 provides a chilling ex-
ample. "[O]n February 26, 1993, a 1,500-pound bomb stashed
in a rental van was detonated on a parking garage ramp beneath
the Twin Towers. The explosion killed six people, injured
about 1,000 more, and exposed vulnerabilities in the World
Trade Center's and [New York's] emergency preparedness. '55 A
bomb packed in a small, simple aircraft would likely produce
the same destruction as commercial airliners loaded with fuel.
Apparently, this idea was contemplated and planned by ter-
rorists in the past. After the arrest of Abdul Hakim Murad (a
terrorist who collaborated with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the direc-
tor of the 1993 World Trade Center car-bombing), U.S. intelli-
gence officers learned that "he had earned his pilot's license in
an American flight school and had been planning to seize a
small plane, fill it with explosives, and fly it into C.I.A. headquar-
ters."56 Murad later confessed "that he had gone to the Ameri-
can flight school 'in preparation for a suicide mission. ' 5 7
Other terrorists plotted to collide a small plane into a commer-
cial airliner during takeoff. Although a light-sport aircraft can-
not fly over 10,000 feet (far below the regular cruising altitude
of commercial aircraft), a small aircraft could collide with an
airliner during takeoff and landing and send it crashing to the
54 Id.
55 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 280.
56 Seymore M. Hersh, Annals of National Security: Missed Messages, Why the Gov-




earth. Light-sport aircraft, however, will be useless for such
attacks. 8
Attempts to pack a small plane with explosives and collide
into a target would require aircraft larger than those allowed
under the sport pilot rules. Some of the planes currently listed
as "likely candidates" for light-sport aircraft classification have
very limited weight capabilities. Most of the candidate aircraft
allow only for approximately 300-pound loads, including the
weight of the pilot.59 Thus, to match the destructive capabilities
of the World Trade Center car-bombing, a larger plane with a
greater payload capacity would be needed to carry out the plot.
A larger plane could carry out such an "aircraft bomb" attack,
and could be piloted with only limited flight knowledge, such as
the knowledge gained from sport pilot training. For example, a
Cessna model Grand Caravan is a simple, single-engine, fixed-
gear aircraft that has been extremely popular for bush pilots,
charter companies and personal/corporate pilots. 6 It is consid-
ered an easy-to-fly aircraft. The Grand Caravan, however, has a
4,500-pound load capacity, and it is also capable of converting
into a "cargo hauler" in less than half an hour, making it easier
to transport heavy, bulky cargo, such as a bomb." Thus, such a
small, easily-flown plane could be used to carry out terrorist
plots; commercial airliners are not the only aircraft capable of
serious damage, nor have they been the only aircraft eyed by
terrorists.
In sum, small aircraft should not be considered harmless in
the hands of a committed terrorist. Although a terrorist plot
involving light aircraft, as opposed to commercial airliners,
would likely require something more than merely crashing the
airplane into a target, light aircraft still pose a threat. However,
supposing a terrorist plot did involve heavy, high-performance
aircraft, the question remains whether an individual armed with
only basic flight training - such as that gained from attaining an
SPL - can fly such aircraft.
58 BBC News, supra note 52.
59 See Sport-Pilot Eligible Aircraft, http://www.sportpilot.org/Isa/likelyjlsa.
html (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
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PART III: FLYING COMPLICATED AIRCRAFT WITH ONLY BASIC,
LIMITED FLIGHT TRAINING
Because the SPL significantly relaxes the requirements to get
a basic, low-rated pilot's license, there is concern that this op-
portunity might be used to carry out terrorist plots that mimic
9/11. The 9/11 hijackers trained briefly on large commercial
aircraft, as well as small, single-engine aircraft. Therefore, one
must question whether a would-be terrorist could quickly ac-
quire an SPL and use basic flight knowledge to fly heavy, trans-
port category aircraft. Some experts believe that flight training
is not even necessary to fly a large airplane. Rather, an under-
standing of aircraft navigation and avionics will suffice.
Experts disagree whether an individual with limited flight
training can control a commercial airliner once airborne. No
one, however, disputes that the skills needed to pilot a modern
commercial airliner take years to develop. The requirements to
obtain a commercial pilot license dwarf the requirements for
the SPL or a private pilot license.62 Yet, after completing the
pre-flight procedures and the difficult takeoff, most pilots rely
on autopilot controls to fly the aircraft. Therefore, while a basic
understanding of flight is necessary for the simplest aircraft ma-
neuvers (such as executing turns and maintaining level flight), a
commercial pilot license may not be necessary to fly a commer-
cial airliner after it is airborne. According to Phillip Poyner, a
board member of the National Association of Flight Instructors
("NAFI") and NAFI Master Flight Instructor:
A common misunderstanding is that skills learned in initial flight
training would be transferable to those exercised by terrorists
controlling transport category aircraft. The vast majority of ini-
tial and recurrent flight training in the country is conducted in
small, piston-powered, single engine aircraft. The skills derived
62 Besides the difficult knowledge and practical exams, a person who applies
for a commercial pilot license with a multi-engine class rating must log at least
250 hours of flight time as a pilot that consists of at least: 100 hours in powered
aircraft, of which fifty hours must be in airplanes; 100 hours of pilot-in-command
flight time, which includes at least fifty hours in airplanes; ten hours of training
in a multi-engine airplane that has a retractable landing gear, flaps, and control-
lable pitch propellers, or is turbine-powered; ten hours of solo flight time in a
multi-engine airplane or ten hours of flight time performing the duties of pilot in
command in a multiengine airplane with an authorized instructor; one cross-
country flight of not less than 300 nautical miles total distance with landings at a
minimum of three points, one of which is a straight-line distance of at least 250
nautical miles from the original departure point. 14 C.F.R. § 61.129 (b)(1)-
(2) (i), 3(ii), 4(i) (2005).
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from this training are not directly transferable to transport cate-
gory aircraft without considerable, additional training. There-
fore, it should be understood that the vast majority of flight
training has no relevance to the flight activities of terrorists on
September 1lth."3
Not everyone, however, agrees with Poynor. Arnold
Beichman, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stan-
ford University, believes that
[t]o take off and land a modern jetliner takes skill, years of train-
ing, and an ability to read and understand the instrument panel.
But to fly either a Boeing 737, 757, 767 or... any modern pas-
senger jet once it is airborne ... is no big deal. Anybody with a
little training can engage the autopilot of a hijacked plane to go
to the GPS (Global Positioning System) coordinates for the
World Trade Center towers - and the target is in your
gunsights.
64
In fact, the 9/11 terrorists relied on airline pilots to get the
aircraft off the ground before the hijackings occurred. After
gaining control of the planes, the terrorists relied on the planes'
autopilot systems to control them.65 Once the targets were in
sight, the attackers merely steered the aircraft into them."" In
fact, "one of the September 11 hijackers rented small aircraft
several times in the summer before the attacks for practice
flights. ' 6
7
Further, commercial airline training is much more rigorous
and technologically advanced than basic flight training for the
SPL. For example, all commercial airline pilots receive training
on a flight simulator - an expensive machine that simulates the
sensation of flight and real-world scenarios. 61 Commentators ar-
gue that "simulator training would be an essential 'fail-safe' asset
once the planes [sic] were hijacked," and such training would
almost ensure that a plot to crash a plane into a target would
63 Testimony, Phillip Poynor, Principal, Nassau Flyers, Inc., (Sept. 25, 2001)
(onfile with author).
64 Beichman, supra note 9.
65 9/11 COMMISSION REPoRr, supra note 1, at 12. In fact, Boeing aircraft were
selected over those manufactured by Airbus because the latter were equipped
with autopilot safety controls, which prevented the planes from being crashed
into the ground. Id. at 245.
66 Id. at 6 (stating that the plane was "flying erratically" and was "all over the
place").
67 Elizabeth Wolfe, U.S. Begins Tighter Hight School Checks, WASHINGTON POST,
Oct. 22, 2004.
68 Beichman, supra note 9.
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succeed.6" Conversely, the very limited instruction required for
the SPL makes it unlikely that SPL training would include exer-
cises on aircraft simulators.
Sport pilot training does not require extensive training be-
cause of the limited capabilities of light-sport aircraft. Sport pi-
lot training for a fixed-wing aircraft merely includes basic
knowledge of flight, i.e. maneuvers required to takeoff, land and
keep an aircraft airborne y.7  The complexities of commercial air-
craft make it difficult, but not impossible, to utilize basic flight
fundamentals to pilot a large, high-performance aircraft. The
simple control stick functions to maneuver a small plane are
similar to those functions applied to larger aircraft. A majority
of comments on the SPL contended that "the light-sport aircraft
definition should be expanded to accept ... additional aircraft
simply because these larger or higher performance aircraft
could be safely operated as light-sport aircraft."'y  The FAA,
however, "believes it would not be appropriate or safe for per-
sons with the minimum training and experience of a sport pilot
to operate faster or heavier aircraft. ' y2
If Arnold Beichman is correct on his theory of GPS knowl-
edge, then it is arguable that the only knowledge required to fly
a hijacked airliner, once airborne, is an ability to understand the
Global Positioning System. Flight training is not required to
learn this, as is evident from the prevalence of civilian-use GPS
devices on the market. Additionally, commercial aircraft train-
ing and instruction manuals contain information on the air-
craft's avionics, including GPS navigation. 3  Therefore, a
hijacker arguably could navigate a large airliner and program its
destination, provided that the hijacker is proficient in aircraft
navigation and avionics.
Even if, however, sport pilot training provides the necessary
skills to hijack a large aircraft, issuance of the license should not
be suspended. Revocation of the SPL would not solve the prob-
lem of terrorists enrolling in U.S. flight schools. Rather, the so-
69 Id.
70 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.311 (2005) (requiring sport pilots to pass flight profi-
ciency tests which demonstrate the ability to take-off, land, and execute perform-
ance maneuvers).
71 Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Air-
craft, 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,791.
72 Id. at 44,796.
73 Flight handbooks and manuals for commercial aircraft as well as flight, ra-
dio, and avionics handbooks are readily available on the internet.
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lution should focus on improved screening of passengers and
flight school students. This tactic promotes the benefits of the
SPL and simultaneously addresses its vulnerabilities. After 9/11,
the government began meticulously investigating civilian pilots
to assess whether they posed a threat to aviation and national
security. Such screenings, however, were not being rigorously
pursued before 9/11.
PART IV: PRE-9/11 SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENTS FOR U.S.
FLIGHT SCHOOL APPLICANTS
The 9/11 attacks prompted Congress to mandate investiga-
tions of non-U.S. citizens that enrolled in U.S. flight schools.
Before these new procedures can be explained, however, the
pre-9/11 security procedures towards flight schools must be ex-
amined for comparative analysis. This part of the comment
does not attempt to re-write the 9/11 Commission Report nor
derive alternative theories for the intelligence and defense ef-
forts that failed to thwart the 9/11 attacks. Rather, it exposes
the concerns and priorities of aviation authorities prior to 9/11.
Further, it explains the security assessment protocols that ap-
plied to non-U.S. citizens who applied for U.S. flight training, so
that the new TSA threat assessments can be compared to their
predecessors in Part V.
Airline hijackings are not a recent occurrence and U.S. intelli-
gence agencies have long known that "terror groups are known
to be planning and training for hijackings."74 "As early as 1975,
according to an unpublished Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee document ... the F.B.I.'s assistant director for intelligence
revealed that a suspected member of Black September [a Pales-
tinian terrorist group] . . . had explained his presence in the
United States by telling the F.B.I. that he had been admitted for
pilot training - the same explanation for the presence of a num-
ber of the September 11th terrorists. ' 75 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service stated that "thousands of Middle Eas-
terners have obtained visas to enroll in flight-instruction pro-
grams" in recent decades. 76
Prior to 9/11, however, the FAA seemed more concerned
about aviation sabotage, rather than airplane hijackings, be-
cause no domestic hijacking had occurred in over a decade and
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many officials considered the aviation industry to be more vul-
nerable to explosives rather than firearms.7 7 "In 1996, after the
ciash of T.W.A. flight 800 [off the coast of Long Island], a com-
mission directed by Vice-President Al Gore called for closer liai-
son" between intelligence agencies and the FAA. 78 The airlines,
however, were successful in their lobbying efforts against many
safety procedures recommended by the Gore commission, "such
as more stringent security checks on airline employees and
tighter screening of passenger baggage. '79 The events of 9/11
quieted the airlines.
Prior to 9/11 and the FAA's creation of flight school security
checks, "[t]he FAA's policy was to use intelligence to identify
both specific plots and general threats to civil aviation security
so that the agency could develop and deploy appropriate coun-
termeasures." ° This overwhelming volume of intelligence gath-
ering, however, eventually overburdened the FAA.
"[I]nformation on the FBI's effort in 1998 to assess the potential
use of flight training by terrorists and the Phoenix electronic
communication of 2001 warning of radical Middle Easterners
attending flight school were not passed to FAA headquarters."'"
The pre-9/11 security threat assessments did not focus on
flight schools, even though the FAA was receiving numerous re-
ports of suspicious flight students in U.S. flight schools. The
multi-layer security threats focused more on airport security,
rather than on flight school security. The threat assessments fo-
cused on passenger pre-screening to ferret out passengers that
posed "more than a minimal risk to aircraft," checkpoint screen-
ing as passengers entered the airport gateways and security on
board commercial aircraft, specifically teaching flight crews to
deal with hijackers.8 2 "FAA training material provided no gui-
dance for flight crews should violence occur" on board an air-
borne aircraft.8 3
The post-9/11 investigations showed that the FAA ignored
"alarm bells" from flight school reports regarding suspicious stu-
dents - students who later turned out to be those responsible
77 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
78 Hersh, supra note 56.
79 Id.
80 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 83.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 84-85.
83 Id. at 85.
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for 9/11." Flight instructors at the Pan Am International Flight
Academy repeatedly warned the FAA about Middle-Eastern stu-
dents, with poor English skills, who were pursuing flight training
for commercial airliners.
8 5
In sum, the FAA's security measures to identify threatening
flight school students were mostly bureaucratic, inefficient and
ineffective. There were no threat assessments for flight school
applicants, and the FAA expected suspicious flight school activ-
ity to be spotted by flight school managers and instructors. The
schools that reported suspicious students were "clearly more
alert than federal officials" said U.S. Representative Martin
Sabo, who sits on the House Homeland Security Appropriations
Committee."6 Although 9/11 cannot singularly be blamed on
the FAA's failure to notice suspicious flight school students, it
was a contributing factor in the attacks. In response to this over-
sight, every non-U.S. citizen who now enrolls in a U.S. flight
school must be investigated for any security threats; SPL appli-
cants are also subject to these procedures. Many recreational
aviation enthusiasts decry these screenings and argue that they
do more harm than good for general recreational aviation.
PART V: THE TSA's NEWlY IMPLEMENTED SECURITY CHECKS ON
U.S. FLIGHT SCHOOLS
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, general aviation airports were not
subject to federal rules regarding air security; only airports serv-
ing scheduled operations were reviewed. 7 Since the attacks,
however, "the TSA must examine all aspects of the transporta-
tion system for vulnerabilities to terrorist activities.""8 Currently,
"TSA has not taken a position that [general aviation] airports
and aircraft are a threat, in and of themselves. However, as vul-
nerabilities within other areas of aviation have been reduced,
[general aviation] may be perceived as a more attractive target
and consequently more vulnerable to misuse by terrorists."8 "
84 Gordon, supra note 10.
85 Id.
8- Id.
87 Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports, supra note 18, at 4. "General
aviation" is described by the FAA as "all civil aviation activities except those associ-
ated with airlines." FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA STUDENT PILOT GUIDE, FAA-H-
8083-27 (1999), available at http://wv.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/me-
dia/faa h 8083_27.pdf.
8 Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports, supra note 18, at 4.
89 Id.
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Thus, following the 9/11 attacks, "the Aviation and Transpor-
tation Security Act mandated that the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice conduct threat assessments for non-U.S. citizens who sought
training on aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more including
commercial aircraft."9 ° This responsibility was transferred to the
TSA on December 12, 2003, by the Vision 100 - Century of Avia-
tion Reauthorization Act.91 On September 20, 2004, the TSA
announced implementation of Alien Flight Training Rule, 92
which required the TSA to assess threats of "non-U.S. citizens
seeking training at U.S. flight schools, regardless of the type and
size of aircraft" on which training was sought.93 According to
the TSA, the rule's benefit "will be increased protection of U.S.
citizens and property from acts of terrorism."94 The rule will
"decrease the chance that a flight school student who poses a
security threat will be able to receive flight training from a U.S.
flight school in the operation of aircraft that could be used in an
act of terrorism."95The new procedures, put into effect October
22, 2004, will prevent terrorists from acquiring any flight train-
ing in U.S. flight schools regardless of the size of the aircraft.96
The TSA said that its rule "will provide greater security benefits
than the IJustice Department's] rule97 because it applies to
aliens seeking training on smaller aircraft, and it also improves
90 TSA Press Release, supra note 3 (referring to Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)). Before passage of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Congress sought to prevent any alien
from training to fly a jet-propulsion aircraft unless the flight school or trainer
received confirmation from the U.S. Attorney General that a background check
had been completed on the alien. U.S. Commission on Transportation and In-
frastructure, Providing for Consideration of H.R. 1350, Secure Transportation of
America Act of 2001, H.R. Rep. No. 107-264, § 111 (2001).
91 Vision 100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176,
117 Stat. 2490 (2003).
92 Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals; Security Aware-
ness Training for Flight School Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,324 (proposed Sept.
20, 2004) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1552).
93 TSA Press Release, supra note 3.
94 Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals; Security Aware-
ness Training for Flight School Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. at 56,339.
95 Id.
96 Ann Davis, a spokeswoman for the TSA said that the purpose of the proce-
dures is to "check for potential risks to national security before [students are]
admitted to flight school." Tutino, supra note 16. The new rules will apply to any
person providing aircraft training, including "freelance flight instructors." Infor-
mation on the TSA Alien Flight Training Rule, available at http://www.faa.gov/fsdo/
stlfsdo/alien.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2005); see also 49 C.F.R. § 1552.1(b)
(2005).
97 See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
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security at flight schools through the requirement for security
awareness training." '
Overview of the TSA Alien Flight Training Rule
The TSA rule "prohibits a flight school from providing flight
training to an alien unless the flight school notifies TSA that the
alien has requested flight training, and the alien provides cer-
tain information to TSA."99 "Certain information" refers to fin-
gerprints, biographical information, including full name,
passport and visa information, a photograph to the TSA and
specific information regarding the applicant's desired train-
ing. '0 Evidence of U.S. citizenship may be proven by showing
the flight school, or flight instructor, a valid unexpired U.S.
passport, original birth certificate and government-issued pic-
ture ID, original U.S. naturalization or citizenship certificate
with raised seal and government-issued picture ID or an original
certificate of U.S. citizenship and government-issued picture
ID. "1 "The TSA will conduct a security threat assessment by us-
ing FBI fingerprint criminal record checks, and other available
data for potential terrorist threats and immigration viola-
tions." 102 "If TSA determines that an applicant poses a threat to
aviation or national security, TSA will inform the flight school to
immediately terminate the applicant's training."10 3
The TSA began review of all foreign flight-school applicants
on December 19, 2004.104 Prior to several amendments to the
Alien Flight Training Rule, the security assessments included
foreigners who already possessed a certified pilot's license.
However, the assessments did not require review of "foreign stu-
dents already in training or enrolled in flight schools" (unless
they commenced training for another level or type of air-
craft). 1 5 This requirement drew complaints from flight schools
98 Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals; Security Aware-
ness Training for Flight School Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. at 56,339.
- Letter from Chad Wolf, Assistant Administrator for Transportation Security
Policy, TSA, Flight Schools Subject to 49 C.F.R. pt. 1552, Docket No. TSA-2004-
19147 (Oct. 19, 2004), at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/TSAIFR_
Exemptions.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
100 49 C.F.R. § 1552.3(a), (c) (2005).
t0 49 C.F.R. § 1552.3(h) (2005).
102 Tutino, supra note 16.
1113 Information on the TSA Alien Flight Training Rule, supra note 96.
104 TSA Press Release, supra note 3.
105 Wolfe, supra note 67. Due to criticisms from recreational aviation lobbyists,
the TSA revoked the requirement that non-U.S. citizens who seek training on
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because, as some argued, "more security checks for many for-
eign airline pilots is needless since they have often already been
fingerprinted and checked by their airline for U.S. visas and by
the Justice Department." 106 The Department of Justice states
that approximately 30,000 foreign persons applied to U.S. flight
schools in 2003, and the new rules were expected to impact
more than 100,000 seeking flight training since 2003. 107
The new rules create four categories encompassing all non-
U.S. citizen flight students who pursue training. "Category one"
applies to "candidates for training in aircraft over 12,500-pounds
who are not current and qualified to fly the aircraft that they are
requesting to train on and are not eligible for Category 2."18
Students who are classified under "category two" are eligible for
expedited processing of the security threat assessments; the re-
view must be completed by the TSA in five days. 109 "Category
two" applies to candidates who hold a foreign airman certificate
that is recognized by the FAA; candidates who are employed by
a foreign air carrier that operates under 14 CFR part 129 and
has an approved security program permitted under 49 CFR part
1546; candidates with unescorted access authority to a Secure
Identification Display Area (SIDA); and candidates who have
successfully completed a criminal history records check in accor-
dance with 49 CFR 1544.230.110
"Category three" applies to "candidates for training in aircraft
12,500-pounds or less who are not current and qualified to fly
the aircraft that they are requesting to train on.""'1 "Category
four" comprises all recurrent training for "candidates who are
current and qualified on the aircraft that they are requesting to
train on."' 1 2 Recurrent training "includes flight reviews, profi-
ciency checks, and 'any other check whose purpose is to review
rules, maneuvers, or procedures or to demonstrate a pilot's ex-
aircraft for which they are already licensed undergo the security assessments. As
the rule currently stands, only licensed non-U.S. citizens who train for a higher-
level aircraft must undergo the screenings. TSA Website, Flight Training for Non-
U.S. Citizens, at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?content=09000519800d8df0
(last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
106 Wolfe, supra note 68.
107 Id.; Sara Kehaulani Goo, TSA Tightens Rules for Flight Training, Noncitizens
Face New Scrutiny, WASHINGTON POST, (Oct. 23, 2004), at All.







isting skills on aircraft with a maximum certificated weight of
12,500 pounds or less."'" 3 Thus, the rules do not require the
threat assessments for non-U.S. citizens who are not seeking
training on a higher rated or heavier aircraft.
The TSA's responsibility to assess security threats posed by SPL trainee
Clearly, security concerns regarding pilot certification and
identification were considered during the passage of the sport
pilot rule. During the public comment period of the rule,
"[o]ne state's Department of Transportation's aeronautical divi-
sion expressed concern that allowing persons with a driver's li-
cense, as a sole form of identification, to have access to airports
and the airspace system would reduce pilot identification stan-
dards and would lead to reduced security." '114 The commenter
said that since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, airport security iden-
tification, as well as pilot identification, are under greater scru-
tiny, and higher standards must be established to prevent
unauthorized access to airports and aircraft. The commenter
stated that additional scrutiny provided by the process of ob-
taining a pilot certificate, an airman medical certificate and
passing an FAA practical test, is a welcome safety enhancement
at this time and must not be eliminated." 15
The FAA agreed with such comments and, therefore, the TSA
threat assessments will apply to individuals training for their
SPL. The SPL, however, has another oversight body, the Light
Sport Standardization Branch of the FAA's Regulatory Support
Division. 1 6 "The Light Sport Standardization Branch is tasked
to manage and provide oversight of the sport pilot examiner
and the light sport aircraft repairman-training programs. Addi-
tionally [sic] the branch is tasked with providing subject matter
experts for the FAA and industry concerning the sport pilot/
light sport aircraft safety initiatives."' 17
The Light Sport Standardization Branch conducts initial and
recurrent standardization courses for sport pilot examiners, ap-
113 TSA Announces Modifications of Rules for Flight Schools and GUls, http://vw.
nafinet.org/tsa modifications.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
114 Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Air-
craft, 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,774.
115 Id. at 44,774-75.
116 Regulatory Support Division, Light-Sport Aviation Branch, http://NWWv.faa.
gov/ about/ office-org/ headquarte rsoffices / avs/ offices/ afs/ afs600 / afs6101
(last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
117 Id.
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points and provides oversight of sport pilot examiners, accepts
industry repairman courses for the certification of light sport
aircraft repairman, conducts annual sport pilot examiner recur-
rent flight tests and provides timely information to the FAA and
industry concerning sport pilot/light sport aircraft initiatives.
The branch supports the development and revision of sport pi-
lot practical test standards and airman knowledge tests. The
branch personnel also provide support for FAA and TSA courses
concerning sport pilot/light sport aircraft accident investigation
and standardization procedures."'
The TSA delegated many of its security awareness responsibilities to
flight schools and flight instructors.
Although the TSA has the ultimate authority over flight
school security, it has reduced its burden by delegating impor-
tant responsibilities to the front line, namely, flight schools and
flight instructors. For example, the new TSA rule requires flight
school instructors and employees to take "security awareness
training" on the TSA website "that would teach employees how
to recognize suspicious activity."119 Further, flight schools are
required to "ensure that each of its flight school employees who
has direct contact with students (including flight instructors,
ground instructors, chief instructors and administrative person-
nel who have direct contact with students) receives both initial
and recurrent security awareness training."20 Moreover, the
TSA gave flight schools the option of requiring its employees to
take the TSA's awareness training online, or the school may cre-
ate its own program, provided that it complies with the stan-
dards set forth in the "Flight Training for Aliens and Other
Designated Individuals; Security Awareness Training for Flight
School Employees" rule. 121 If the flight school creates its own
awareness program,
it must require active participation by the flight school employee
receiving the training.
118 Id.
119 Sara Keuhaulani Goo, supra note 107.
120 General Aviation: Flight School Security Awareness Training, http://www.
tsa.gov/public/interapp/editorial/editorial_1727.xml (last visited Nov. 28,
2005); see also Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals, Secur-
ity Awareness Training for Flight School Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,324, 56,336
(Sept. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 1552).
12, General Aviation: Flight School Security Awareness Training, supra note
120; see 49 C.F.R. § 1552.23 (2005).
522
SPORT PILOT LICENSES
Studies have shown that individuals retain information better
when they receive the information in an interactive format than
when they receive the information passively (for example, by
merely listening to a lecture). Thus, the TSA initial training pro-
gram is interactive, and TSA believes that any alternative initial
training program must be as well. 12
Second, an alternative security awareness training program
'must provide situational scenarios that require the employee to
assess specific situations and determine appropriate courses of
action."'23 Third, the alternative training must ensure that an
employee be able "to identify the proper uniforms and other
identification (if any are required at the flight school) for em-
ployees at that flight school or other persons authorized to be
on the grounds of that flight school. The training also must en-
able an employee to identify suspicious behavior. ' 124 Fourth, an
alternative program is required to "provide an employee with
appropriate responses for the employee to make in specific situ-
ations. Appropriate responses include: taking no action, . . .
questioning an individual, ... informing a supervisor, . . . or
calling local law enforcement."' 125 Last, an alternative security
awareness program "must contain any other information rele-
vant to security measures or procedures at the flight school, in-
cluding applicable information in the TSA Information
Publication 'Security Guidelines for General Aviation Air-
ports.' '' 26 Interestingly, "[a] flight school is not required to sub-
mit its alternative initial security awareness training program to
TSA for approval before the flight school uses the program to
comply with the rule. Rather, TSA officials may audit a flight
12 Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals; Security
Awareness Training for Flight School Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. at 56,336.
123 Id.
124 Id. (defining "suspicious behavior" as "excessive or unusual interest in re-
stricted airspace or restricted ground structures, such as repeated requests to fly
over nuclear power plants; unusual questions or interest regarding aircraft capa-
bilities; aeronautical knowledge inconsistent with the student's existing airman
credentialing; sudden termination of the student's instruction; loitering on the
flight school grounds for extended periods of time; and entering "authorized
access only" areas without permission"); see also 49 C.F.R. § 1552.23 (2005).
125 Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals; Security
Awareness Training for Flight School Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. at 56,336; see also
49 C.F.R. § 1552.23(c)(3)(v)(A)-(E).
121 Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals; Security
Awareness Training for Flight School Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. at 56,336.
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school's alternative training program when inspecting the flight
school." 12 7
In sum, despite the fact that the TSA does not consider gen-
eral aviation to be excessively vulnerable to terrorism, the new
security protocols impose many new security requirements on
flight schools. These rules focus on flight school and general
airport security, and the rules delegate much of the security re-
sponsibilities to flight instructors and flight schools. This dele-
gation of responsibility has not been overwhelmingly welcomed
by general aviation enthusiasts.
PART VI: THE IMPACT OF THE NEW TSA THREAT ASSESSMENTS
ON THE SPL AND GENERAL RECREATIONAL AvIATION IN
THE UNITED STATES
Although the Alien Flight Training Rule and security assess-
ments for flight schools were much-needed safety measures, they
have not received unanimous support from aviation enthusiasts.
Just as enthusiasts heralded the SPL because it promoted recrea-
tional aviation, they decried the security measures and alleged
that they would drastically cripple the aviation industry. Critics
of the security measures claimed that they were burdensome,
confusing, time consuming, financially straining and a hin-
drance to individuals seeking a pilot's license. Some people,
however, believe these complaints are unfounded and believe
the new rules are beneficial to general aviation. These people
also believe that the new SPL's promotion of recreational avia-
tion will impact the aviation industry in a very positive manner.
Additionally, supporters of the rules praise the TSA's efforts to
involve flight schools, flight instructors and general aviation pi-
lots in homeland security initiatives.
The TSA's new rules were quickly met with disapproval from
private flight instructors and flight schools because they created
financial and record-keeping problems. 128 The Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association ("AOPA") said that the "measures will
127 Id. at 56,337.
128 NAF Efforts Help Obtain Security Modifications for Flight Instructors and Schools,
http://www.nafinet.org/news/ (follow Jan. 11, 2005 hyperlink) (last visited Nov.
28, 2005). Although the original TSA proposal required "that [flight] schools
keep citizenship records of students for five years," the new procedures merely
require schools to "verify that the student's citizenship documents are authentic,
then note that in a logbook ... the TSA agreed to this concept as it goes a long
way towards easing the paperwork burden on the flight training community."
Sara Kehaulani Goo, supra note 107.
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force flight schools to perform immigration and citizenship ver-
ification duties that the government should perform.' 2 Orga-
nizations such as the National Association of Flight Instructors
("NAFI") pressured the TSA into easing the "confusing" regula-
tions."" David St. George, the manager of the "East Hill Flying
Club in Lansing which train[s] non-citizens, many from nearby
Cornell University ... said the new regulations will cost foreign
flight students about $200 in fingerprint and administrative
fees."'' St. George also expressed concerns that the systems
used by flight schools to conform to the threat assessment
screenings may not be up and running in all flight schools.'32
Therefore, those flight schools may be grounded until they com-
ply, and business will suffer.'33
Furthermore, foreign students comprise a significant propor-
tion of flight school business, making the new rules more finan-
cially straining on schools. St. George estimates that foreign
students make up "as much as 25 percent of [their] business." '134
Many flight trainers expressed concern that the new procedures
are over-inclusive because they say that "any non-U.S. citizen is a
threat."' 15 The TSA, however, stated that it does not expect the
rule to have "a significant impact on the overall demand for U.S.
flight school training" because the rule only impacts non-U.S.
citizens, a group that is small compared to the total number of
U.S. flight students."' The TSA admitted that "costs will in-
crease for alien flight school candidates" but the impact "will
not be significant because U.S. flight training is considered to be
the global standard, and it is comparatively less expensive to ob-
tain a pilot's certificate in the U.S. than in most foreign
countries." 37
General aviation is a booming industry in the U.S. and, there-
fore, any security measures must be carefully tailored to avoid
negative economic impacts on the industry. General aviation ac-
counts for approximately seventy-seven percent of all flights in
129 Id.
130 NAFI EfJorts Help Obtain Security Modifications for Flight Instructors and Schools,
supra note 128.





116 Flight Training for Aliens and Other Designated Individuals; Security
Awareness Training for Flight School Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. at 56,338.
137 Id.
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the U.S., as well as more than 200,000 aircraft, 650,000 pilots,
and over 19,000 domestic airports and landing sites.'l 8 The gen-
eral aviation industry "accounts for 1.3 million jobs, with nearly
$20 billion in annual earnings. Its direct and indirect economic
impact exceeds $102 billion annually."1 9 Therefore, some avia-
tion enthusiasts believe that "[a] nything that affects [general avi-
ation flight education] has short and long-term consequences
not only on general aviation, but on everyone who uses the Na-
tional Airspace System: General Aviation, Commercial Aviation,
the Air Carriers, and, to some extent, the military."14
Aviation lobbyists sought to reduce the negative impacts that
the TSA security assessments have on recreational aviation, and
lobbyists testified before congressional committees to remind
lawmakers of the importance of general recreational aviation.
One benefit of recreational aviation, they noted, is that "general
aviation flight instructors teach to fly approximately sixty-three
percent of pilots hired by America's major, national, regional
and commuter airlines." '141 "Without civilian-trained general avi-
ation pilots, the airline industry could not possibly find, train,
and hire the pilots it will need.' 1 42 General aviation flight in-
struction is critical for "aerial operations from law enforcement
and search-and-rescue to aerial application (crop dusting) and
transportation services to the nation's remote areas (bush fly-
ing) ... if the airlines are the backbone of the aviation industry,
flight training is its lifeblood. 143
Furthermore, the TSA recognized that general aviation en-
thusiasts can play a vital role in homeland security. During the
week leading up to the inauguration of President Bush for his
second term, the TSA asked general aviation pilots and aircraft
and airport owners and operators to be on alert for "suspicious
activities."' 44 This was not the first time the TSA called upon
general and recreational pilots to assist authorities in securing
the homeland. In November 2003, the Aviation Security Advi-
sory Committee Working Group, a coalition of general aviation
138 General Aviation: What is General Aviation?, http://www.tsa.gov/public/
display?theme=180 (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).





144 TSA Asks GA: Be Alert During Inauguration Week, http://www.eaa.org/com-
munications/eaanews/archive0105.html (follow "01/14/05" hyperlink) (last vis-
ited Nov. 28, 2005).
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associations, helped the TSA publish an Information Publica-
tion on Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports.1'4 5
Together, the federal government and the aviation industry de-
veloped security guidelines to ensure that training-aircraft were
not subject to unauthorized use at flight schools. The recom-
mendations suggest that flight schools should:
require flight students to use proper entrances and exits to ramp
areas [and] . . . consider having flight school personnel allow
access to ramp areas only after establishing positive identification
of flight students.
Establish positive identification of student pilots prior to every
flight lesson.
Control aircraft ignition keys, [and] . . . limit student pilot access
to aircraft keys until the student pilot has reached an appropriate
point in the training curriculum.
Consider having any student pilot check in with a specific em-
ployee . . . before being allowed access to parked aircraft.
When available, use a different ignition key from the door lock
key. The instructor would provide the ignition key when he or
she arrives at the aircraft. 4 '
In addition to the above recommendations, the FAA also took
steps to protect pilot identities and protect aircraft from individ-
uals masquerading as pilots. In July 2003, the FAA began issuing
new, "security-enhanced" airman certificates to active pilots.'47
"The new credit card-sized certificates are made from high-qual-
ity composite PVC media card stock and incorporate new secur-
ity features, such as a hologram of the FAA seal. They will
replace the existing paper airman certificates which can be eas-
145 Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports, supra note 18, at iii. The
Working Group members who collaborated on the report are: Aircraft Owners &
Pilots Association, Airports Consultants Council, American Association of Airport
Executives, Experimental Aircraft Association, General Aviation Manufacturers
Association, Helicopter Association International, National Air Transportation
Association, National Association of State Aviation Officials, National Business
Aviation Association, and United States Parachute Association. Aviation Sec. Ad-
visory Comm., Report of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working
Group on General Aviation Airports Security at 1 (Oct. 1, 2003), at http://www.
tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/ASACWorking-Group-11-2003.pdf (last visited
Nov. 28, 2005).
1413 Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports, supra note 18, at 9.
147 Press Release, Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Administrator Unveils
New Airman Certificate (July 31, 2003), available at http://www.faa.gov/apa/pr/
pr.cfm?id= 1762.
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ily damaged. 1 4 The new certificates will be issued to newly-li-
censed pilots, including sport pilots. 49
The TSA security measures are necessary and important, but
some aviation enthusiasts complain that they may delegate too
much responsibility for identifying terrorist threats to flight
school managers and instructors. Whether or not the FAA's ap-
proach will be effective remains to be seen. However, consider-
ing the bureaucratic difficulties inherent in the TSA
procedures, 150 it could prove wise to ask the instructors, who
have face-to-face, personal contact with students, to be the ones
on the alert. Some aviation enthusiasts support the self-help
rules because they keep federal agencies at bay. "In order to
prevent increased government restrictions and regulations on
flight schools and general aviation, it would be more palatable
for the general aviation community to establish and adhere to
their own voluntary security standards."'1 51
In sum, the new security measures' inconveniences are out-
weighed by the benefits heaped upon aviation security and the
promotion of general aviation. They do create a financial bur-
den on trainees and flight schools, but these burdens appear,
for the most part, nominal. Further, the increased security-re-
lated responsibilities imposed on flight schools and instructors
are sensible, considering that these are the parties in the best
positions to identify a suspicious student. The fact that flight
schools and instructors are more involved in the security threat
assessments will likely effectuate the goals of the new proce-
dures. In short, the critiques of the new rules seem to state a
"parade of evils" rather than actual impositions.
CONCLUSION: THE SPL AND NEW TSA SECURITY MEASURES ARE
NOT LIKELY TO GIVE TERRORISTS MORE ACCESS TO
U.S. FLIGHT TRAINING.
"Many people in government - and the public at large - see
flight training as part of a recreational activity that is not particu-
larly critical to the national interest. After all, flight instructors
teach people to fly those 'little planes.' ,15 2 Whether or not this
statement is indeed true of the "public at large," recreational
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See generally Gordon, supra note 10; Hersh, supra note 56.
151 Daniel J. Benny, Flight School Security (2002), http://www.iflyamerica.org/
flightschool/security.htm.
152 Testimony of Phillip Poynor, supra note 63.
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aviation remains an important component of the general avia-
tion industry. Thus, recreational aviation should be promoted,
but it must be made to conform to the changes necessitated by
the 9/11 attacks.
The SPL is a significant milestone for recreational aviation, in
that it will introduce new enthusiasts to the sport. The increase
of sport pilots should have a positive impact on the aviation in-
dustry as they acquire their own aircraft, and demand for rental
planes increases. Further, many sport pilots may eventually pur-
sue upper-level licenses or fly for an air carrier. These new privi-
leges, however, accompany important responsibilities, and the
SPL must not become an entry-point for terrorists seeking to
carry out another 9/11-style attack.
The threat of a light sport aircraft being used in the same
manner as the 9/11 commercial airline's is almost non-existent.
A 1,320-pound, single-engine aircraft simply is not capable of
the level of destruction as that of larger, faster, jet-propulsion
aircraft. Flying such a small plane into a building is comparable
to driving a car through a large building. Therefore, the SPL,
and the aircraft authorized to be flown with it, do not pose a
threat serious enough to revoke the new SPL. Although light
sport aircraft themselves do not pose a serious threat, the train-
ing may, because someone armed with the basic fundamentals
of flight training could effectively navigate a larger aircraft, once
airborne. Thus, in order to ensure general aviation safety, the
SPL should not be eliminated. Rather, the most logical precau-
tion seems to be exactly what the TSA has already undertaken -
meticulous threat assessments on individuals applying for flight
schools.
The TSA recognized the necessity of carefully monitoring and
identifying suspicious individuals who apply for flight training in
the U.S. "Since 9/11, the TSA has already taken steps to guard
against unauthorized use of flight school or rental aircraft, re-
quired background checks for foreign pilots seeking a U.S. pilot
certificate, and is working with the Department of Justice to
track suspicious aircraft purchases." 1'  Their recent implemen-
tation of security threat assessments and the Alien Flight Train-
ing Rule are important steps to maintaining flight school safety.
Despite concerns about the rules, it is unlikely that they will pre-
153 Press Release, Transportation Security Administration, TSA Outlines SecuIr-
ity Recommendations for General Aviation, (Dec. 1, 2003), http://ww.tsa.gov/
public/display?theme=44&content=090005198006ed60.
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sent a serious impediment on individuals seeking their SPL.
The increased cost for non-U.S. citizens, $130 for the applica-
tion,15 4 is minimal when compared to the total cost for flight
training. 155 For an individual willing to invest the time and
money in basic instruction (in addition to aircraft rental, insur-
ance, airport fees and continuing instruction once licensed),
the $130 TSA application fee does not seem to pose as signifi-
cant an obstacle as the rule's opponents claim.
Opponents to the new TSA rules also argue that the investiga-
tion of students' threat levels places burdensome obstacles on
students who want to begin flying right away. This, however, is
the purpose behind the rules to allow the TSA to investigate
flight school applicants before training begins. As a measure of
good faith, however, the TSA recently decreased the time frame
for conducting the threat assessments for students training on
aircraft weighing over 12,500-pounds, which includes commer-
cial airplanes. The TSA scaled back the previous forty-five-day
deadline in favor of a thirty-day deadline. 156 Thus, non-U.S. ap-
plicants will see only a thirty-day delay before they begin training
on large aircraft. The burden is even less for sport pilot training
because light-sport aircraft fall under the "category three" re-
quirements for aircraft weighing less than 12,500-pounds. 57
"Category three" students can begin training when the "TSA ac-
"1158 Iknowledges receipt of all the required information. It is esti
mated that it will take forty-five minutes for an individual to
assemble the required materials requested by the TSA and that
each flight school will see an annual record-keeping burden of
only 104 hours.159 Although complaints may arise from students
who submit the information and are allowed to train, but later
154 TSA Press Release, supra note 3.
155 Basic flight instruction typically costs between $100 to $140 per hour in-
cluding instruction and aircraft rental. Id.; see Ultralight Training Unit, http://
www.mordenflyingclub.com/?page=train (last visited Nov. 28, 2005); Flight In-
structions, http://www.sportpilotairsports.com/pending/flight-instruction.htm
(last visited Nov. 28, 2005). The sport pilot license requires twenty hours of train-
ing to be certified in an airplane, bringing the cost to approximately $1,900 to
$2,800.
156 TSA Press Release, supra note 3.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Department of Homeland Security, Notice, Notice of Intent To Request
Renewal From the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) of One Current
Public Collection of Information; Flight Training for Aliens and Other Desig-
nated Individuals; Security Awareness Training for Flight School Employees, 69
Fed. Reg. 68,952, (Nov. 26, 2004).
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fail the TSA screening, sport pilot students will not see an imme-
diate impediment from the new TSA requirements. These small
burdens are a pittance in exchange for promotion of a safe, se-
cure general aviation industry.
The TSA also alleviated problems that may arise from the in-
creased number of security threat assessments that will need to
be performed for non-U.S. citizens who pursue an SPL. By
transferring many of the responsibilities for flight-school secur-
ity to flight instructors, the TSA has likely eliminated delays that
would result from the increased number of individuals entering
flight school. Despite complaints from flight schools that the
rules are burdensome, the TSA has acknowledged the coin-
plaints and conceded to several of them.
Flight schools should not see the rules as an onus, but merely
a small concession in exchange for greater aviation security and
oversight. The instructors are much more capable of identifying
potentially threatening students that attend their schools; there-
fore, the instructors should continue to be integral participants
in safeguarding U.S. flight schools. The fact that several flight
schools reported suspicious students prior to 9/11 and that fed-
eral agencies failed to follow tip is indicative that instructors can
identify a security problem before agencies such as the FAA and
TSA take notice. Concededly, instructors should not be charged
with the full responsibility of the issue, but the TSA has found a
comfortable and workable solution that incorporates all the nec-
essary parties. Further, the TSA argues that, because of general
aviation's substantial economic impacts, "general aviation opera-
tors are keenly aware of and willing to individually enhance the
security of their operations without government regulation.'
The SPL has not existed long enough to manifest any latent
problems related to aviation terrorism. The FAA wisely opted to
use "a building-block approach in extending privileges to sport
pilots" which will allow the FAA and TSA to expand or withdraw
sport pilot privileges as problems, or lack thereof, begin to sur-
face.'" The real problem, the dedication of anti-American ter-
rorists, may never be overcome despite close monitoring of
flight schools and flight students. Nevertheless, the relaxed re-
'60 Press Release, Transportation Safety Administration, Report Of The Avia-
tion Security Advisory Committee Working Group On General Aviation Airports
Security (Dec. 1, 2003), at http://wwv ,.tsa.gov,/public/display?theme=44&con-
tent=090005198006ed85 (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
161 Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Air-
craft, 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,777.
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quirements for the SPL are not likely to contribute to aviation
terrorism. "The terrorists took advantage of America's strengths
and used them against us. They took advantage of the freedoms
we accord to our citizens and guests . .. [a] nd as long as we
continue to treasure our freedoms, we always will run some risk
of future attacks." 162
162 "FBI Reorganization " Hearing on Reforming the FBI in the 21st Century: Reorga-
nizing and Refocusing The Mission Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 8, 2002) (testimony of Robert Mueller, Director of Federal
Bureau of Investigation). available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/
mueller05O8O2.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2005)
